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 Th e Instrumental Value of 
Legal Accountability 
 Jeff    King * 
 A.  Introduction 
 Any proposal to extend the domain of adjudication can reasonably be met with 
the following good faith question: why? What is valuable about doing that, and 
about legal accountability more generally? A traditional answer suggests that it is 
required to protect the rule of law, or prevent the abuse of powers, or protect our 
rights. But each of these claims is question begging, and not only because these 
are very ambiguous concepts. Even if we all agreed on the core content of these 
ideas, we would still need a deeper answer about what institutional features legal 
accountability possesses that makes it good for serving these ideals. 
 In this essay, I  set out an account of the main instrumental benefi ts of legal 
accountability, and defend that account against some common objections. It is 
intended to provide a general answer to the question, one that is susceptible of 
proof or falsifi cation in terms that it is hoped will attain some measure of general 
agreement. Th at is, it is hoped that if a reader disagrees with any stated benefi t, we 
will agree on what evidence would count as proof or disproof of the assertion. In 
Section B, I explain that my approach to evaluating the question is instrumentalist. 
On this view, legal accountability can be seen as a means for achieving ends, and 
not something to be assessed primarily in terms of its intrinsic value. Th ere is also a 
list of what I consider to be the essential attributes of legal accountability, and these 
attributes help us to understand why it is that legal accountability can claim some 
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of the benefi ts that it does. In Section C, I set out a list of ten prima facie benefi ts. 
I argue there that legal accountability generates ten features that have instrumental 
value:  focus, principled reasoning, constitutional authority, independence and 
impartiality, rule interpretation competence, procedural fairness competence, par-
ticipation, expressiveness, publicity, and inter-institutional collaboration. I defend 
the claim that legal accountability possesses these features, and that these features 
produce (or can produce) valuable ends, and I defend both types of claims against 
some common objections. Th e entire structure of these claims is in prima facie 
terms. I  accept that the fi nal question of the value of legal accountability is to 
be determined in particular contexts. It is hoped that identifying a general list of 
benefi ts will assist the task of evaluating the case for legal accountability in specifi c 
jurisdictions on particular issues. 
 B.  Instrumentalism, legal accountability, 
and prima facie beneﬁ ts 
 Prior to outlining the benefi ts themselves, there is a need for a rather detailed meth-
odological detour of sorts. 
 1.  Instrumentalism, adjudication, and institutional design 
 I agree with the view that the function of law generally is to serve  as a means to an end. 1 
By ‘law’, I mean the set of formal sources and legal standards offi  cially recognized 
as constituting law, 2 and the set of institutional procedures (the legal process) used 
authoritatively by adjudicative institutions to identify and uphold the law. Law is 
used as an instrument, by its authors (and sometimes interpreters) to bring about 
some state of aff airs. Such ends can be intrinsically valuable (eg. equality, liberty, 
dignity, fairness etc.), or can be ends that are themselves means for obtaining other 
things of intrinsic value (eg. prosperity, stability, coordination, transparency, etc.). 
And any instrumentalist account of law’s value must acknowledge that the ends 
secured by law may well be negative, whether by design or accident (eg. domination, 
exploitation, conservation of harmful customs etc.). Law is typically used to secure 
a broad range of ends. 3 
 1  I aim to follow the analysis in  L  Green ,  ‘Law as a Means’ in  P  Cane (ed.)  Th e Hart-Fuller Debate 
in the Twenty-First Century ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2010 ) . 
 2  See  H L A Hart  Th e Concept of Law (2nd edn,  Oxford :  Clarendon Press ,  1997 ) , ch VI. It is com-
patible with the role J Finnis sees for a rule of recognition to play in a system of positive laws,  Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), ch X, both in the ‘selection of viewpoint’ (ch 
I) and in the role for law in securing coordination for the common good (chs IX and X). It corresponds 
roughly to the the sources identifi ed by legal offi  cials as the ‘pre-interpretive’ material in the account of 
law set out in  R  Dworkin  Law’s Empire ( Cambridge, Mass. :  Harvard University Press ,  1986 ) , Chs 2–7. 
 3  I follow H L A Hart in believing that it is unlikely that law serves any one end in particular, even 
if it is well-adapted to a variety of ends: see the Postscript in  Th e Concept of Law, Hart,  Th e Concept 
of Law at 248-9. See also  J  Raz ,  ‘Th e Functions of Law’ in his  Th e Authority of Law ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  1979 ) . 
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 We can at this point state a weak and a strong thesis about the instrumental 
value of law. Th e strong thesis is that the desirability of law is measured  exclusively 
by reference to whether it produces desirable ends. On this view, there is nothing 
intrinsically valuable about law or legal institutions. Th is is a plausible view in my 
mind, but it is not my aim to defend it here. Th e weak thesis is that the evaluation 
of law and legal institutions is  predominantly to be evaluated by reference to the 
ends they produce. 4 Such an account does not deny the possibility of a residual 
intrinsic dignity to the law or legal processes themselves, but it considers it to be 
marginal in any inquiry about the true value of law. Th is paper takes this weaker 
view. In the main, it is concerned to evaluate the value of some aspect of legal 
regulation by examining  what it does . An important consequence of this view is 
that the value of legal accountability is ultimately contextual. 
 I consider what I have said above to be broadly consistent with the views of 
H L A Hart and John Finnis about the nature of (human made) law and legal 
institutions. 5 Ronald Dworkin’s view of what constitutes the law on any given ques-
tion is not straightforwardly compatible with this position, though his view of the 
role and desirability of diff erent modes of adjudication plainly is instrumentalist in 
this manner. 6 Notably, to make such claims about law and legal institutions does 
not imply any strong view about the role of legal instrumentalism in adjudication. 7 
Th at is, one can be an instrumentalist about evaluating the desirability of legal 
processes or doctrines, without suggesting that judges should adopt an instrumentalist 
attitude in their disposal of particular cases. 8 Indeed, as with rule and act conse-
quentialism, the very best case against this type of potential opportunism may be 
an instrumentalist argument that such an approach undermines the proper ends 
of a well-functioning legal system. In my view, instrumentalist arguments are most 
appropriate for the level of institutional design. 
 2.  Th e meaning of ‘legal accountability’ 
 In this essay, I aim to address the value of legal accountability, as defi ned in this 
sub-section, and not of  law as a whole. Marc Bovens off ers a ‘narrow’ sense of the 
 4  Note that although instrumentalists speak of law securing ‘ends’, and that ‘ends’ can be defi ned 
strictly in relation to stated, purposive objectives, instrumentalists typically mean ‘ends’ in a broader 
sense to mean ‘consequences.’ In this sense, legal instrumentalism is in fact best understood as a type 
of legal consequentialism, which employs the term ‘instrumental’ as emphasis upon the ideas that 
is used by persons to achieve goals. Instrumentalists are concerned about side-eff ects, however. See 
further, A Vermeule, ‘Instrumentalisms’  Harvard L Rev (2007) 130: 2113, 2117ff . 
 5  See Hart, Hart,  Th e Concept of Law n 2, ch VI; Finnis,  Natural Law and Natural Rights, n 2, chs 
2, 9, and 10 (the ‘selection of viewpoint’ (ch I) and in the role for law in securing coordination for the 
common good (chs IX and X). 
 6  Dworkin, n 2 above at 93 (setting out ‘the point’ of law as being to justify coercion). On adju-
dication, see  R  Dworkin , ‘ In Praise of Th eory ’  Arizona St L J ( 1997 )  29 :   353 , 364 (his theory is 
‘plainly consequentialist’); see also his  Freedom’s Law: Th e Moral Reading of the American Institution 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), ch 1 (arguing that constitutional judicial review 
 may be one eff ective way to give eff ect to the constitutional conception of democracy he sets out). 
 7  B  Tamanaha  Law as a Means to an End: A Th reat to the Rule of Law ( New York :   Cambridge 
University Press,  2006 ),  1 . 
 8  Green, ‘Law as a Means’, n 1 above at 3–4, is critical of Tamanaha on this point. 
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concept of accountability, in the eff ort to avoid any evaluative dimension and 
obfuscation sometimes found in a discourse that treats accountability as synony-
mous with transparency, responsiveness, controllability and so on. 9 He argues that 
‘[a] ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences.’ 10 I  follow 
Bovens in all these respects. 
 Bovens claims legal accountability is the most ‘unambiguous’ type of accountability, 
and he appears to equate legal accountability with resort to courts. 11 However, 
legal accountability cannot only be defi ned by pointing to the institutions that are 
called courts in various countries. Th e institutional variation in terms of training, 
structure of adjudication, and tenure of judges is profound. It is more useful, there-
fore, to off er an account of the attributes of legal accountability. Th is sheds light 
on why legal accountability off ers certain prima facie benefi ts. And the existence 
of those benefi ts in turn explains the instrumental importance of these particular 
attributes of legal accountability. Accordingly, I would argue that the following are 
essential attributes of legal accountability: 
 (i)  an individual right of petition; 
 (ii)  a functionally independent adjudicator; 
 (iii)  adjudicators interpret and apply publically affi  rmed legal standards; 
 (iv)  adjudicators give decisions that are (a) interpretations of applicable standards, 
which conform to reasonably demanding professional standards of ration-
ality, consistency, and fi delity to those standards and cannons of interpretation, 
(b) they are responsive to the principal submissions, and (c) they are ordinarily 
published; 
 (v)  there is a remedy (which may be declaratory or coercive); and 
 (vi)  the remedy is fi nal (subject to appeal or reversal by due process of law). 
 It is not my purpose in the present essay to insist upon these attributes as being 
essential features or a ‘central case’ of legal accountability in the sense employed 
in general jurisprudence. I am content to stipulate, for the purposes of this essay, 
that the benefi ts claimed in Part C below are for the adjudicative institutions that 
manifest these attributes, subject only to the additional proviso that the output of 
such adjudicators is treated with respect and comity by other public institutions 
and by the public at large. 
 9  M  Bovens , ‘ Analysing and Assessing Accountability:  A  Conceptual Framework ’  13  Eur LJ 
( 2007 )  447 . 
 10  Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing’, 450. 
 11  Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing’, 456. He considers ombudspersons a species of administrative 
accountability. J Mashaw as well appears to equate legal accountability with courts. See his ‘Bureaucracy, 
Democracy and Judicial Review:  Th e Uneasy Coexistence of Legal, Managerial and Political 
Accountability’ in R F Durant (ed.)  Th e Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), ch 24. My view, which for reasons of space cannot be pursued here, is that 
ombudspersons and tribunals share many of the essential attributes of legal accountability outlined in this 
section, and can thus reasonably be viewed as substitutes for courts of law where circumstances demand. 
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 3.  Beneﬁ ts, prima facie beneﬁ ts, and costs 
 I argue in Part C that the prima facie benefi ts of legal accountability are useful 
means for achieving valuable ends. At the most general level, I believe that they 
may secure respect for the following intrinsically valuable ends: individual dignity; 
individual well-being; equal treatment; and fairness. Furthermore, some of the 
prima facie benefi ts also, in my view, secure the following instrumentally valuable 
ends: the rule of law; democratic accountability (self-government); transparency; 
and effi  ciency. Each of these is valuable because it secures further, intrinsically 
valuable ends, such as those given in the list above. 
 I call the list below  prima facie benefi ts because whether they are real benefi ts 
in the fi nal analysis can only be determined by off setting their positive conse-
quences against their costs. So, ‘participation’ (eg. through interventions, public 
interest standing etc.) may appear to be a prima facie benefi t, but further study 
may show that wide participation rights have posed signifi cant challenges for the 
political process. 12 We will only know whether a prima facie benefi t is a real benefi t 
after accounting for such costs. Th at exercise, furthermore, must be contextual. 
Th is therefore raises the question of whether there is any point in speaking of 
prima facie benefi ts in the fi rst place. Why not simply defer any question of the 
value of legal accountability to a wholly contextual analysis that is both jurisdiction- 
and issue-specifi c? Would that not provide for a richer set of relevant variables? 
It certainly would, but in my view there is still a need for a general account of 
the prima facie benefi ts of legal accountability. First, it off ers an index of puta-
tive general benefi ts, which can be subject to fruitful challenge at a general level, 
and not just in isolated circumstances. Much of the analysis below is concerned 
with those general, ‘up-front’ challenges to the prima facie benefi ts that I claim 
for legal accountability. If general arguments are always liable to the criticism of 
being non-contextual, so contextual arguments are liable to being distinguished 
as non-generalizable. And furthermore, a general theme emerges in my treatment 
there. A number of the objections to the prima facie benefi ts of accountability do 
not amount to refutations of the prima facie benefi t. Th ey amount to qualifi cations, 
ones that I believe are addressed through the deployment of interpretive doctrines 
or curial attitudes that manifest proper judicial restraint. (Such objections may, 
however, be strong reasons to avoid extending the province of legal accountability 
too far in particular contexts, for instance where the curative eff ect of the proposed 
solution is unrealistic). 
 Second, a prima facie list helps clarify the institutional component of the 
instrumentalist claim about law’s value. In many discussions about the need for 
law reform, one hears about the need to respect rights, the separation of powers, 
the rule of law, and to provide greater accountability. Yet there is a perennial risk of 
obfuscation when one’s case for change is entirely based on such concepts, because 
people disagree fundamentally on their requirements. A focus on the prima facie 
 12  R B  Stewart , ‘ Th e Reformation of American Administrative Law ’  Harvard L Rev  166 ( 1975 ) 
 88 : 1669 ;  C  Harlow , ‘ Public Law and Popular Justice ’  MLR ( 2002 )  65 :  1 . 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jul 24 2013, NEWGEN
06_Ch06_9780199670024C06.indd   128 7/24/2013   8:47:14 PM
Jeff  King 129
benefi ts listed below, which I  claim are connected to desirable ends, may help 
better inform any such discussions by directing our attention towards a set of 
stipulations are that liable to proof or rebuttal in terms that will command wider 
approval. 
 C.  Th e prima facie beneﬁ ts of legal accountability 
 Th e aim of this section is to present a non-exhaustive list of the most important 
prima facie benefi ts. It is helpful analytically to think of the key claims set out 
below as consisting of two broad categories. First, I argue that legal accountability 
possesses certain  features , which are the prima facie benefi ts. I outline ten of them 
(eg. focus, independence, principled reasoning, etc.). Second, I argue that these 
features can produce valuable consequences (eg. facilitating the rule of law, 
protecting individual dignity etc). Some critics deny either or both of these types 
of claims, and I will take up and reply to some of these important objections. 
 1.  Focus 
 Legal accountability prompts factual focus on the narratives of particular individuals 
and how some policy aff ects them or their rights, and legal focus on a distinct set 
of legal issues which is isolated in strong measure from the competing political 
pressures for time and attention. Th e right of petition, the right to reasons, and 
the duty to interpret and apply standards, all compel this outcome. Th is feature of 
legal accountability promotes respect for individual dignity (showing respect and 
concern for individuals), fairness and equality (considering legitimate grievances 
and claims to inconsistent treatment), and the rule of law (enabling challenges 
to alleged illegality). In respect of focus, legal accountability compares well with 
administrative, political and market-based options for redress. With administra-
tion, the problem is typically inertia. Even sympathetic managers may be unable 
to address a case adequately. 13 With the political process, the complaint must 
compete with other issues that take on grander importance on a crowded agenda. 
It is not a reliable working supposition that issues can be considered in isolation. 
And it is rare, in many countries, to resort to legal accountability to the exclusion 
of these avenues when they are in fact available. Th e market, for its part, off ers little to 
those without bargaining power, and provides little real remedy for abuses of public 
power. A legal process for justiciable problems ensures that the issue is addressed 
formally and that there can be, depending on the strength of access to justice in 
 13  M  Lipsky  Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services ( New York :  Russell 
Sage,  1980 ) ;  S  Halliday  Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law ( Oxford :   Hart 
Publishing,  2004 ) ;  J L  Mashaw  Bureaucratic Justice ( New Haven :  Yale University Press,  1985 ) . Mashaw 
celebrates bureaucratic rationality over the moral treatment model employed by courts, but presents 
much data along the way showing that individualized justice is not the strength of large bureaucracies. 
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the community, an enforceable demand for an offi  cial response to the claimant’s 
arguments. 
 Objections:
 •  Appellate litigation is usually about policy or abstract principles, not discrete issues 
and compelling narratives. 
 Jeremy Waldron argues that this purported feature is largely a myth:  ‘[b] y the 
time [a case] has reached the high appellate level, almost all trace of the original 
fl esh-and-blood right-holders has vanished, and argument such as it is revolves 
around the abstract issue of right in dispute.’ 14 In some important cases this is true. 
Yet in many others it is false. Th ere are many cases where factual narratives do 
provide important insight into the unjust impact of particular policies. Th ese narratives 
are important, for instance, in cases concerning deportation when life-saving medical 
treatment is at risk, 15 or measures that condemn late-claiming asylum seekers to total 
destitution, 16 or national security measures that impose a Kafkaesque bureaucratic 
procedure upon those who have not been shown to have committed any wrong. 17 
Indeed, it is precisely the poignancy of tragic choices in health care allocation, and 
the susceptibility of the judicial process to such ‘fl esh-and-blood’ narratives, that in 
Calabresi and Bobbitt’s view make adjudication improper for that purpose. 18 Lord 
Steyn famously said that in law, context is everything. 19 Even if that is an overstate-
ment, it is a very long way from Waldron’s caricature. At any rate, the benefi t of 
focus is not only about personal narrative. It is about picking out one policy and 
considering its legality in the light of relevant facts and legal standards and, where 
human rights are concerned, comparing its substance with other options in the 
light of comparative experience. While this analysis is at times also carried out in 
Parliament and by government, many issues in adjudication are those not consid-
ered in the process of legislative drafting or administrative rule-making, or may be 
sidelined by dense timetables or aggressive party discipline. 
 •  Litigation is myopic 
 Myopic focus on the issues before the adjudicator is the more problematic objection. 
Judges may have a poor understanding of the dynamic or knock-on eff ects of their 
decisions, 20 and courts are said to provide poor mechanisms for participation by 
those who are ultimately aff ected by decisions. One example of this is when a court 
adjudicates a heavily polycentric problem, meaning a problem that comprises an 
 14  J  Waldron , ‘ Th e Core of the Case Against Judicial Review ’  Yale LJ ( 2006 )  115 :  1379 . 
 15  D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423 (ECtHR); cf.  N v United Kingdom (26565/05) [2008] 
ECHR 453. 
 16  R v SSHD, ex p Limbuela  [2005] UKHL 66. 
 17  A v United Kingdom  (2009) 49 EHRR 29 (ECtHR). 
 18  G  Calabresi and  P  Bobbit  Tragic Choices ( New York :  W W Norton & Co.   1978 ) . 
 19  R(Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 [28]. 
 20  A  Vermuele  Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Th eory of Legal Interpretation ( Cambridge, 
Mass. :  Harvard University Press ,  2006 ) ; Mashaw,  Bureaucratic Justice, n 13 above. 
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elaborate set of interconnected relationships where changes to one relationship 
aff ect many others throughout the network. 21 Focus is needed for obvious reasons 
in individualized adjudications. Yet with review of broader policy questions, the 
costs of focus/myopia rise exponentially. Th is is a real problem, but there have been 
a host of interpretive doctrines that compensate for it. First, there are a variety of 
doctrines of judicial deference and restraint that apply in public law, both general 
and specifi c. 22 In addition to a constant judicial preoccupation with deference to 
expertise, there is also a more or less recognized distinction between adjudicative 
facts and legislative (or social) facts, 23 with a presumption that adjudicators exercise 
more restraint and caution when determining the latter. Second, there is increased 
specialization, both within the judiciary and among tribunals and ombudspersons. 
Th is increased expertise fosters greater awareness of the knock-on eff ects of particular 
decisions. Th ird, legal accountability off ers a measure of remedial fl exibility that 
can adjust to the nature of the problem. Judges can resort to declaratory relief or 
procedural rights, whereas ombudspersons can frame their recommendations to 
enable bureaucratic fl exibility. Lastly, the decisions of these bodies are subject 
to considerable feedback, particularly those of the courts. Lessons are learned, and 
the side-eff ects of myopia are gradually cured. 
 2.  Principled reasoning 
 Adjudicators are generally required to advance interpretations of the public standards 
that are well-reasoned. If they fail to do so, they have failed in their professional 
duty. Th e reasoning must be principled in the sense that it presents proofs and 
reasons in support of a particular interpretation of the relevant sources and policy 
considerations, and valid arguments connecting all together in the text of the 
decision. It is principled in the sense of not merely an appeal to preferences (unless 
the community’s preferences are legally relevant), or to values or considerations 
that lie outside the sources to which it is proper to refer. 
 Th is has fi ve important consequences that can be benefi cial. First, it entails  logical 
rigour . Adjudicators must consider all relevant considerations, observe consistency in 
their argument, and follow professional interpretive conventions. Second, it ordi-
narily entails  responsiveness to the submissions and relevant arguments, and thus 
treatment of counter-arguments. Th ird, it engenders  professional scrutiny of the product, 
which reinforces the fi rst two consequences. (Th is third item is particularly true of 
 21  See  W F  Allison , ‘ Th e Procedural Reason for Judicial Restraint ’  PL ( 1994 )  452–73 . Cf J A King, 
‘Th e Pervasiveness of Polycentricity’  PL (2008) 101. 
 22  Th e literature here is vast. For more recent work, see  A  Kavanagh , ‘ Defending Deference in Public 
Law and Constitutional Th eory ’  LQR ( 2010 )  126 :  222 ;  T R S  Allan argues against the need for any 
doctrine:  ‘ Judicial Deference and Judicial Review:  Legal Doctrine and Legal Th eory ’  LQR ( 2011 ) 
 127 :  96 ;  J  King  Judging Social Rights ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2012 ), P II;  P  Daly 
 A Th eory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope ( Cambridge :   Cambridge 
University Press ,  2012 ) . 
 23  K C  Davis  Administrative Law Treatise Vol 2 ( St. Paul, Minnesota :  West Publishing Co.  1958 ), 
 353 , at [15.03]. See Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US), which sets out rules relating to 
judicial notice of adjudicative (not legislative) facts. 
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the higher decisions of the law courts; less so for lower courts and tribunal deci-
sions). Th e form of professional scrutiny there includes hierarchical supervision, 
third-party intervention, academic commentary, comparative analysis by foreign 
courts, and occasionally public and political scrutiny. Common law adjudicators 
are in that sense extremely accountable for their decisions, even if not easily removable. 
Fourth, the process creates a  good faith attempt at objectivity . 24 Even if being objec-
tive is impossible,  trying to be objective and impartial delivers real benefi ts and 
reduces the extent to which law suff ers from the vices of opportunism. Legal account-
ability enables the party to adduce proofs and reasons and compels the adjudicator 
to give a principled response, in a process largely transparent and open for scrutiny. 
Fifth, legal accountability enjoys a distinct advantage for  evidence assessment and 
fact-fi nding . Courts are the exemplary institution for the establishment of adjudica-
tive facts and can even, at times, be eff ective in the diffi  cult task of determining 
complex questions of causation and sifting through materials relating to the establish-
ment of legislative facts. 25 Th is is due to the mode of principled reasoning and 
adjudicator-independence inherent in legal accountability institutions. It is for this 
reason that judges are at times chosen to conduct important public inquiries. 26 
 We have good reason for valuing these consequences. Th ere is a range of decisions 
a political community may want to resolve through this type of reasoning process. 
Some such decisions may include jurisdictional disputes between levels of government, 
border disputes, criminal responsibility, certain questions of rights, deportation, 
and at least some aspects of the treatment of minorities and marginalized groups 
more generally. Furthermore, I would contend that this reasoning process is an 
essential precondition for the rule of law. Th e resort by individuals to courts would 
be largely pointless if there were no predictability or legitimacy to the process of 
reasoning used in the courts. 
 Objections:
 •  Legal standards run out quickly, and then judging is mostly the application of 
judicial preferences. 
 Th e argument above is not blind to the rise and fall of the legal process school of 
jurisprudence in the United States, 27 which advocated ‘neutral principles’ and the 
principle of institutional settlement. 28 Neither is it ignorant of the insights from 
 24  See Tamanaha  Laws as a Means to an End, n 7 above at 234–41;  K  Greenawalt  Law and Objectivity 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1992 ) , esp. ch 10. 
 25  Davis,  Administrative Law Treatise , n 23 above at [15.03]; see also his ‘Judicial Notice’ Columbia 
L Rev (1955) 55:945. Davis pointed out judicial limitations but also felt that the adjudication of 
legislative facts was inescapable and necessary in litigation. 
 26  J  Beatson , ‘ Should Judges Conduct Public Inquiries? ’  LQR ( 2005 )  121 :  221 . 
 27  See H M Hart Jr and A M Sacks  Th e Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application 
of Law (prepared for publication from the 1958 Tentative Edition and containing an introductory 
essay by W N Eskridge Jr and P P Frickey) (Westbury, New York: Foundation Press, 1994). See also 
 N  Duxbury  Patterns of American Jurisprudence ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1992 ), ch 4 for an 
account of the school’s rise and fall. 
 28  H  Wechsler , ‘ Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law ’  Harvard L Rev ( 1959 )  73 :  1 and 
see also the introductory essay by Eskridge Jr. and Frickey, 
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legal realism and critical legal studies. Th e claims asserted are meant to be comparative 
only, and furthermore subject to the important qualifi cations I make below. 
 Th e objection stated above would be false, if by it one means that judicial outcomes 
are chiefl y determined by naked preferences. It amounts to a radical and outmoded 
form of legal realism. 29 Judges’ decisions are constrained by a range of legal stand-
ards, and their conclusions within the interstices must be plausibly linked to those 
standards. Th is is reinforced by the requirements of reason giving, publication of 
decisions, and professional and academic scrutiny thereof. 
 It is true that judges will appeal to policy and moral arguments in settling legal 
disputes, and of course their sense of moral judgment and preferences will aff ect 
their evaluation of such arguments. However, even these arguments, to some extent 
unmoored from the legal standards, are subject to some important basic constraints. 
First, they must be  generally acceptable  forms of public reason. Th is does not mean 
that they command consensus, but it does commonly exclude certain types of 
arguments, such as (in many though not all liberal democracies) direct appeals 
to the law of God, 30 appeals to radical theories of law and the state such as those 
found in Communist or fascist writings, the use of theories positing racial or 
gender superiority, and so on. Secondly, the moral views espoused must at the 
very least fi t with the principles recognized by the legal system. It is not typically 
open to judges to apply exotic moral theories, and fi t (and perhaps institutional 
conservatism) is largely the explanation. Th ird, there is a presumption that policy 
arguments in particular will be supported by evidence, whether of a legal or factual 
nature. Now, obviously all of these ‘requirements’ are ignored from time to time in 
specifi c cases. However, when that occurs, judges are departing from their role as 
a judge. Th ey become open to the criticism that they have breached professional 
norms of conduct. I take this much to be inherent in the nature of the reasoning 
process within the framework of legal accountability that I set out in Part B above. 
When the breach is persistent, we can consider there to be a crisis. But the very 
fact that that state of aff airs constitutes a crisis confi rms the appropriateness of the 
status quo outlined here. 
 No doubt, the stronger objection here is that these are very weak constraints 
on the application of judicial preferences. For some courts, depending on their 
docket, the constraints of precedent, and the nature of the legal questions submitted 
to them, this may well be true. However, for many others, which move incremen-
tally, take strong account of academic views, have relatively low rates of dissent, 
and whose decisions are more predictable, this view is not accurate. And we must 
not commit the fallacy of equating apex courts with the entire system of legal 
accountability, or indeed, with the broader system of administrative justice. Th eir 
dockets are by their very nature made up of hard cases. 
 29  Tamanaha,  Law as a Means to an End ,n 7 above at 237–9, also accepts that the institutional 
constraints of judging are real and not marginal. Attitudinal studies present a challenge to this view 
and are considered briefl y at notes 49–50 below and accompanying text. 
 30  Of course such references have occurred and continue to do so, but often in situations in which 
there is a high degree of consensus that such references are acceptable as evidence of a community’s 
positive morality. 
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 •  Legislators and administrators are better than courts at principled reasoning, so 
nothing is gained by subjecting their decisions to legal reversal. 
 Constitutional review will often require courts to address the same principled 
arguments and evidence as has the legislature. Yet much of parliamentary debate is 
exemplary of principled reasoning. Legislatures have certain epistemic advantages 
as well, given the diverse range of inputs into the legislative process. Th e commit-
tee system in the UK Parliament, for example, has augmented this capacity to a 
very impressive extent. Ideally, the process works best when government appoints 
experts to report on an issue, solicits viewpoints at the green and white paper stages, 
hears further views during drafting and later the committee stages of the legislative 
process. Th is happens frequently enough. 31 However, it is common ground that 
legislatures are subject to pressures that distort principled reasoning in a number 
of ways, chief among them being party discipline. If committee votes are subject to 
party discipline, then independence is in fact lacking, and decisions on voting can 
and often are made before even hearing the evidence meant to inform the decision. 
Another pressure is time and priorities. Of course legislatures have more time than 
the courts do, but any bill comprises a massive range of matters, and parties must 
prioritize in ways that can marginalize even the rights-issues they sympathize with. 
Above all are the problems of inadequate representation of marginalized groups, 
and of a legislative process that fails to see the consequences of a certain enact-
ment. All these failings and more are diagnosed and analysed by Rosalind Dixon 
in her insightful analysis of what she terms legislative ‘blind-spots’ and ‘burdens 
of inertia.’ 32 
 •  Administrative agencies are better (indeed normally better) at principled reasoning, 
objectivity and assessment of evidence than courts. 
 Th is statement is largely true of some very important agencies, and it ties well 
with the original justifi cation for the growth of agencies in the fi rst place. Yet the 
objection merely justifi es an appropriate level of judicial deference, and does not 
eliminate the prima facie benefi t contended for here. Agencies are obviously better 
at saying whether global warming is imminent, or whether some drug is likely to be 
cost-eff ective. Th is objection is especially true when the issue under determination is 
highly complex, and the agency applies its collective expertise to it. And such judge-
ments are not rare either. As a managerial matter, moreover, agencies are much 
better than judges at evaluating costs and adjusting to the costs and benefi ts for 
most larger programmes. 33 Th is all justifi es a strong measure of judicial restraint. 
However, judicial restraint is compatible with retaining general public law jurisdiction 
over agencies. 
 31  It was what occurred, eg., in the lead up to the passage of the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement 
Act 2007. 
 32  ‘Creating Dialogue About Socio-economic Rights:  Strong-form Versus Weak-form Judicial 
Review Revisited’  I.CON (2007) 5: 391; see also R  Dixon , ‘ Th e Supreme Court of Canada, Charter 
Dialogue, and Deference ’  Osgoode Hall Law Journal ( 2009 )  47 :  235 , 257-60. 
 33  Mashaw,  Bureaucratic Justice , n 13 above; Vermeule, n 20 above. 
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 In fact this is necessary, as, quite apart from review of routine matters of statutory 
interpretation and procedural fairness, bureaucracies have their familiar fl aws in 
the area of principled reasoning as well. Administrative behaviour suff ers from 
unstoppable inertia, lack of resources for careful deliberation or reconsideration, 
and programming and political imperatives that interfere with the reasoning 
process. 34 Bureaucrats adopt heuristics, which often lead to high error rates that 
the administration may be slow to acknowledge, and in some cases powerless to 
correct. 35 Th e less routine the decision, the more political infl uence is liable to 
exert control. All these considerations work against blanket judicial deference 
to administration, and qualify the familiar case for judicial restraint. Th us the objection 
is an important qualifi cation, one that justifi es a central principle in public law, as 
it should. 
 3.  Constitutional authority 
 Courts have a form of constitutional authority owing to their historical constitutional 
role, their role in protecting the rule of law, and as a forum for asserting individual 
rights. Th ey are thus accorded respect by political institutions and the public. 
Judges tend to have high intelligence, rigorous training, and follow transparent 
procedures. Th ey play an extensive role in shaping and creating many rules governing 
private and public relations, most of them against a backdrop of moral considerations. 
As an organized political community, we seek not just dispute resolution from 
courts, but  justice and the preservation of the rule of law. Courts are regarded 
as having a constitutional responsibility to enforce and to some extent fashion 
these values. Th is constitutional authority is peculiar to courts, but other formal 
accountability mechanisms may eventually come to share this attribute. 
 Th is authority has four potentially valuable institutional consequences. Th e fi rst 
is  political responsiveness , namely, that government and the public ordinarily accord 
court rulings respect and take them seriously. 36 Th e power to award enforceable 
remedies—ranging from fairly lax to quite intrusive—can in principle ensure politi-
cal responsiveness, at least in the case at bar. Th e second important consequence is 
 judicial confi dence ; namely, the willingness of judges to take a controversial stand on 
matters with signifi cant policy or social ramifi cations. Th ere are several cases involv-
ing issues that rest signifi cantly on this type of political confi dence, 37 constituting 
 34  See Lipsky,  Street Level Bureaucracy , n 13 above;  M  Derthick  Agency Under Stress ( Washington, 
DC :  Brookings Institution Press ,  1990 ) . 
 35  K C  Davis  Discretionary Justice:  A  Preliminary Enquiry ( Chicago :   University of Illinois Press , 
 1971 ) ; Derthick,  Agency Under Stress , ch 2; Mashaw,  Bureaucratic Justice , n 13 above; King, Judging 
Social Rights , n 22 above, ch 8. 
 36  P  Cane ,  ‘Understanding Judicial Review and its Impact’ in  M  Hertogh and  S  Halliday (eds)  Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives ( Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2004 ),  15 ,  19 : ‘It is certainly arguable that the status of the Administrative Court is 
critical to its ability to entertain complaints against the political executive of central government in the 
reasonable expectation that any fi nding against the government will be taken seriously.’ 
 37  R v Inspectorate for Pollution, ex p Greenpeace (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 (QBD);  R v Secretary 
of State for Foreign Aff airs, ex p World Development Movement [1995] 1 WLR 386 (QBD) (standing); 
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what Peter Cane describes as ‘high profi le judicial review.’ 38 A third valuable institu-
tional consequence is that courts (though not tribunals or ombudspersons) have 
 general jurisdiction . 39 Th is helps to ensure that there are few holes in the regime of 
accountability, and that there is a general presumption of legal accountability in 
play that cannot be ousted easily or in piecemeal fashion. A fourth aspect is  reme-
dial fl exibility . Judges can choose a broad range of remedial responses to problems 
of illegality, and the common trend in bills of rights is to give courts the power to 
award ‘appropriate remedies’ or ‘just satisfaction.’ Th is fl exibility helps them adapt 
legal accountability to the needs of modern administration. All these features can 
and often do faciliate the attainment of the broad variety of ends identifi ed in 
Part B.3 above. 
 Objections:
 •  Th ese ‘benefi ts’ are actually detriments. 
 It is a fair charge that for all the above reasons, the blade of legal accountability 
cuts deeper into administration and politics than it ought to. 40 It is true that this 
‘benefi t’ of legal accountability is ultimately dependent on whether the costs of 
judicial intervention are outweighed by the benefi ts. It is therefore admitted that 
the link between the feature of legal accountability and the desirable end is less 
straightforward than with some of the other benefi ts. Th e benefi t here is more in 
the realm of a potential benefi t. It is akin (to borrow a familiar example) to a blade 
that cuts well, but which can ultimately be used for good or bad. Its potential for 
good makes it a prima facie benefi t. If so, a sceptic may ask, why not call it a prima 
facie detriment? Th e answer here is that in my view the evidence on the whole 
supports the view that the practice is generally benefi cial. 41 No critic of the judicial 
review of administrative action to my knowledge goes so far as to say that we can 
do without it. 
 •  Th is argument overestimates the impact of legal accountability. 
 Th ere are a range of studies about the impact of adjudication. Some focus on 
the impact of constitutional rights litigation in particular, and other forms of 
 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) (construction of ouster clauses); 
 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex p Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1997] 1 WLR 
275 (CA) (the vires of regulations that infringe on subsistence rights);  R v North East Dev on Health 
Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA) (the enforceability of a substantive legitimate expecta-
tions);  A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (detention without 
trial);  Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya as Saudiya (Th e Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 
[2006] UKHL 26 (admissibility of torture evidence);  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66 (ministerial capacity to forbid support to certain indigent asylum 
seekers). 
 38  Cane, ‘Understanding Judicial Review’, n 36 above at 18. 
 39  At times courts will contract this general jurisdiction, either through doctrines of justiciability, or 
through procedural rulings such as the rule in  O’Reilly v Mackman  [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL) that public 
law rights claims could only be raised through the judicial review procedure. 
 40  J A G  Griffi  th  Th e Politics of the Judiciary (5th edn,  London :  Fontana Press, London   1997 ) . 
 41  I consider these arguments in more depth in King,  Judging Social Rights , n 22 above, ch 3. 
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cause-lawyering. 42 Th ese studies are mostly American, and deal with a sub-set 
of legal accountability. In that literature, the tide has turned against (and indeed 
never swam with) a strong version of the ‘hollow hope’ argument famously off ered 
up by Gerald Rosenberg, 43 an argument that largely overlooks (or relegates to a 
late chapter) the iterative relationship between law and politics that cause-lawyers 
have navigated with signifi cant success over the years since the early days of the 
civil rights movement. 44 
 Th e UK studies focus on the impact of conventional judicial review. 45 Halliday’s 
study of homelessness decision-making in London local authorities provides notable 
insight into the limitations of judicial impact. He shows that, in the authorities 
he studied, there were few applications for judicial review, little absorption of legal 
standards into local authority behaviour, and a problem of ‘creative compliance’ 
whereby authorities use their knowledge of the legal process to evade legal 
control. 46 Th is literature is an antidote to quixotic notions of what legal accountability 
can deliver. It qualifi es but does not refute the premise of political responsiveness, 
however. Th at responsiveness is evident in too much of judicial review, including 
several statutory amendments after cases taken under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998)  or won in Strasbourg, in the nearly one million tribunal cases 
disposed of annually, and in the near total rate of compliance with the recommenda-
tions of the Parliamentary Commissioner of Administration (Ombudsman) and 
local government ombudsmen. 47 
 4.  Independence and impartiality 
 Th e independence of the judiciary from strong political pressure is often off ered 
as a leading argument in support of judicial review, 48 and of course recourse to 
 42  Surveys of the voluminous literature are provided in the chapters by McCann and Epps in  K 
E  Whittington ,  R D  Kelemen and  G A  Caldeira (eds)  Th e Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics 
( New York :  Oxford University Press  2008 ) , chs 32 and 37. See also  A  Sarat and  A  Scheingold (eds) 
 Cause Lawyers and Social Movements ( Stanford :  Stanford University Press ,  2010 ) . 
 43  Th e classic is  G  Rosenberg  Th e Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2nd edn, 
 Chicago :   University of Chicago Press,  2008 ) . See also  D  Horowitz  Th e Courts and Social Policy 
( Washington DC :  Brookings Institution,  1977 ) , and  M  Klarman  From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: Th e 
Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality ( New York :  Oxford University Press,   2004 ) . 
 44  See the essays above, n 69. I analyse the hollow hope argument and this literature in King,  Judging 
Social Rights, n 22 above, ch 3. 
 45  Th e leading current exemplar is Halliday,  Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative 
Law, n 13 above, and a survey of other current literature is available in Hertogh and Halliday,  Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact, n 36 above. 
 46  Halliday,  Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law , 61–5, n 13 above; see also  I 
 Loveland  Housing Homeless Persons ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1995 ), ch 11 for similar conclusions. 
 47  I have answered this important objection more fully in King,  Judging Social Rights , n 2 above, 
ch.3. For a snapshot of the European Convention’s strong recent impact on domestic law and pol-
icy, see Ministry of Justice,  Responding to Human Rights Judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (Cmnd 8432, 2012). On compliance with local government ombudsmen reports, the 
2011–12 Annual Report of the Local Government Ombudsman for England and Wales states that 
out of 3,347 remedies issued, councils ‘resisted’ in two cases only (see < http://www.lgo.org.uk/publi-
cations/annual-report-2011-12-perf-measuring-success/> (accessed 5 November 2012)). 
 48  Rhodes v Chapman (1981) 452 US 359 (Brennan, J., concurring).  J H  Ely  Democracy and 
Distrust: A Th eory of Judicial Review ( Cambridge, Mass :  Harvard University Press ,  1980 ) . 
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independent courts is a central feature of the rule of law. Independence here means 
functional (not formal) immunity from control or improper infl uence, and 
impartiality means the absence of bias in favour of one side to a dispute. Functional 
independence is compromised by political control of adjudicators, but also by 
eff ective control or infl uence by religious authorities, or private groups such as militias, 
nationalist or ethnic groups, threats by crime syndicates and so forth. Bias is often 
a byproduct of lack of independence, but it can be voluntary when adjudicators 
abandon professional norms of interpretation and show preference for a party. Th is 
may be done due to political or personal favouritism, or simple corruption. 
 Functional independence and impartiality produce clearly valuable consequences, 
the most notable being those associated with the rule of law. It is a precondition for 
any eff ective judicial review (of the administrative law variety). It straightforwardly 
reinforces many of the benefi ts listed elsewhere in this essay, such as principled 
reasoning, constitutional authority and procedural fairness competence. And there 
is also little doubt that independent adjudication is a precondition for reliable 
contracting and thus effi  cient commercial relationships, which can produce economic 
effi  ciency and hence growth. 
 Objection:
 •  Judges are political. 
 When people make this objection, they may employ the term ‘political’ in a narrow 
or broad sense. Th e narrow sense is the claim that adjudicators and especially 
common law appellate judges decide some cases primarily with the objective of 
achieving their personal policy preferences. Th ere has been an extensive amount 
of increasingly sophisticated empirical analysis exploring this premise over the last 
sixty years, mostly in relation to American appellate judges. 49 Th is literature deliv-
ers a strong blow to the conventional view that law constrains judges. However, its 
conclusions are not straightforward support for the claim that judges act to further 
political ends.Th e leading studies focus on the atypical US Supreme Court, and 
the phenomena highlighted in such studies appears more acute in America than 
abroad. 50 
 Nonetheless, there is a broader sense of ‘political’ which is that adjudicators, 
even if they do not implement their political preferences directly, do so indirectly 
because of the inescapability of judicial discretion or judgement, especially when 
 49  For a review of the diff erent models of judicial decision-making, see  L  Baum ,  ‘Motivation and 
Judicial Behavior:  Expanding the Scope of Inquiry’ in  Klein and  Mitchell (eds)  Th e Psychology of 
Judicial Decision-Making ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2010 ) . Th e leading attitudinal study is  J A 
 Segal and  H A  Spaeth  Th e Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited ( Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2002 ) . I am very grateful to Cheryl Th omas for diverting me from an unduly sim-
plistic analysis of the attitudinal studies. 
 50  Th ese points merely echo those of others and are not meant as a rebuttal of the studies: see  R 
 Posner  How Judges Th ink ( Cambridge, Mass :  Harvard University Press,  2008 ) , 25–9; Tamanaha,  Law 
as a Means to an End , n 7 above at 240. For a detailed critique and new model, see  M A  Bailey and  F 
 Maltzman  Th e Constrained Court: Law, Politics and the Decisions Justices Make ( Princeton :  Princeton 
University Press ,  2011 ) . 
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enforcing vague norms. Posner, for instance, is a critic of the narrow version of the 
argument that judges are political, but an advocate of this broader statement. 51 
Almost no one doubts, however, that a judge’s view of political morality will infl u-
ence the decisions she renders. 52 But that fact does not destroy an adjudicator’s 
independence. Indeed, in many cases of adjudication (perhaps all) we  want judges 
to apply their moral sensibilities in their assessment of what the law requires in a 
given case. Can we imagine a morality-blind family or tort law? Th e claim about 
legal accountability made here is that the adjudicators are independent and impartial 
as between the parties, and that they make a good faith attempt at objectivity,  not 
that they are wholly objective in their application of the law. 
 One might argue in agreement with Marxists and structuralist philosophers that 
the entire institution of law is so suff used with class or ideological bias that even the 
noblest of adjudicators cannot help but take the wrong side by exhibiting a systematic 
and pernicious class bias. Yet the historian E P Th ompson, himself a Marxist, 
refuted these claims in his  Whigs and Hunters , a study of the use of the Black Act 
1723 to criminalize the encroachment by persons onto royal forests. He did so by 
affi  rming the very benefi ts set out here:
 It is inherent in the especial character of law, as a body of rules and procedures, that it 
shall apply logical criteria with reference to standards of universality and equity. [. ..] Most 
men have a strong sense of justice, at least with regard to their own interests. If the law 
is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute 
nothing to any class’s hegemony. Th e essential precondition for the eff ectiveness of law, in 
its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation 
and shall seem to be just. 53 
 Th ompson showed how particular laws were tools for extending and protecting 
class interests, but also that a system of at least reasonably impartial legal accountability 
(the ‘rule of law’) was more or less essential for the maintenance and legitimation 
of that system. Th at system to him represented a ‘cultural achievement of universal 
signifi cance’ and the rule of law an ‘unqualifi ed human good’  . 54 
 Now, to invoke Th ompson in this way is not a mere appeal to leftist authority to 
settle the matter of the impact of class bias on the law. Th at would be a fallacy, and 
there are anyway many others who might be cited for a contrary proposition. 
However, as with the views of Harold Laski that I discuss in the next section, the 
fact that Th ompson pushed back against this aspect of Marxist doctrine is telling. 
It was, in my view, a rare moment of clarity and honesty within an industry of 
 51  Posner,  How Judges Th ink,  25–9. 
 52  Certainly Dworkin does not take such a view:  see his  A Matter of Principle , (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985), ch 1. 
 53  E P  Th ompson  Whigs and Hunters: Th e Origin of the Black Act ( New York :  Pantheon Books ,  1976 ), 
 262–3 . 
 54  Th ompson,  Whigs and Hunters, 265. Th is conclusion was treated by Th ompson’s left-wing 
contemporaries as ‘apostasy’, as Daniel H Cole puts it in ‘An Unqualifi ed Human Good:  E.P. 
Th ompson and the Rule of Law’  Journal of Law and Society (2001) 28: 177, esp. at 189ff . Marx himself, 
and his later and most infl uential work, owed much if not all to the protection of the rule of law in 
nineteenth century England. 
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obfuscation. It is important to pin down the leftist objection, however, to know 
whether it amounts to more than an evocative and ambivalent complaint about a 
defect in law. When those who advance the class bias argument actually confront 
the spectre of unaccountable power by considering the option as a real legislative 
possibility, 55 or see it in comparative historical perspective (as did Th ompson, by 
comparison with other European states in the nineteenth century, and some obvious 
candidates in the twentieth), one is forced to be honest about the true signifi cance 
of the claim. It states the limits of the benefi t, rather than a negation of it. Th ose 
who press the point too far off er solace to tyrants. 
 5.  Rule interpretation competence 
 Legal adjudicators are good at rule interpretation. Th e type of reasoning used in 
legal adjudication possesses several pertinent sub-features: it employs an elaborate 
set of interpretive cannons of interpretation; 56 it provides a suitably forensic process 
and forum for considering competing interpretations of complex texts; the respect 
for consistency (an observable objective of all well-functioning legal systems) 
produces fairness between similarly situated persons, and predictability for legisla-
tors; and the publication of decisions about interpretation, coupled with intense 
professional and appellate scrutiny, reinforces all the above and provides transparency 
and thus general accountability. 
 Th e greatest advantage of all the above is that it facilitates democratic government. 
Th e rule of law is an essential feature of a proper functioning democracy, and a 
body with rule interpretation competence is an essential feature of the rule of law. 
Th e rule of law is required in order for Parliament to be assured that its choices 
will be respected. A body with rule-interpretation competence of the sort described 
above protects such choices. When legislation is drafted, it is done consciously in 
awareness of the cannons of interpretation, 57 and in the expectation that courts 
will pronounce upon compliance. Any new government inherits a large range of 
past political commitments embodied in legislation. Th e rule of law guarantees 
that the government of the day is legally accountable for such commitments, and 
requires that they only be undone through the same forum in which they were 
enacted. 
 Th e relevance of rule-interpretation competence extends well beyond the inter-
pretation of statutes. Th e legal regime governing a modern bureaucracy is also 
interlaced with regulations, guidance, circulars, precedent and stated policy. Th ese 
standards pervade and structure the discretion of offi  cials throughout government, 
and in Kenneth Culp Davis’ view, their proliferation was crucial for promoting the 
rule of law in bureaucracy. 58 Th e profusion of such written standards, coupled with 
 55  See the discussion in the next sub-section discussing Harold J Laksi’s position on special courts 
for interpreting statutes. 
 56  F A R  Bennion ( K E  Goodall ed.)  Statutory Interpretation (5th rev edn,  London :  Butterworths ,  2007 ) . 
 57  Bennion, for example, was Parliamentary Counsel (drafting UK government legislation) from 
1953–65 and 1973–5. 
 58  Davis,  Discretionary Justice , n 35 above. 
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legal accountability, means that government must operate in a reasonably transparent 
and consistent manner, treating like cases alike and providing real remedies for 
those adversely aff ected by executive conduct that diverges from the stated policy. 
Th is accountability empowers persons by conferring real rights on them (whose 
enforcement admittedly depends on the health of access to justice), by providing 
recourse to a system that formally demands a consistent interpretation and applica-
tion of such standards. A further byproduct of the system is the preservation of the 
rationality and consistency of the entire scheme, which not only furthers respect 
for rule of law values (eg. predictability) but is also important for the eff ective 
delivery of policy and maintenance of clear lines of political accountability. 
 Objection:
 •  Judges have a poor track record with statutory interpretation. 
 Th e dangers of overzealous adherence to ‘extravagant’ notions of the rule of law are 
well known. 59 Th ere is a voluminous critical literature, particularly in the United 
States, on what the correct approach to the interpretation of statutes ought to 
be  — particularly agency statutory interpretation  — replete with strong criticisms 
of existing and past approaches. 60 Early workers’ compensation and industrial legis-
lation in Britain was often interpreted in conservative ways that impeded statutory 
objectives. 61 One can agree with many of the criticisms found in such literature 
while also maintaining that rule interpretation competence is a prima facie benefi t 
of legal accountability. Th e tenor of the criticisms here again speaks to the need for 
judicial restraint, not in total denial of benefi t. Th is nuance is best exemplifi ed in 
position of the political theorist and public intellectual, Harold J Laski, who sat on 
the Donoughmore Committee that reported in 1932 on the appropriate types of 
accountability that might accompany the rapidly expanding role of administrative 
discretion and delegated legislation in the new British welfare state. Laski set out 
a separate opinion in an addendum to the Report of the Committee, commenting 
on the issue of whether to oust the jurisdiction of the law courts from the inter-
pretation of statutes: 62 
 I wholly concur in the conclusion of the Committee that it is undesirable to transfer the 
interpretation of statutes which defi ne and control the administrative process (whether 
 59  Davis,  Discretionary Justice, 28–42;  C  Harlow and  R  Rawlings ,  Law and Administration (3rd edn, 
 Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2009 ),  ch 1. 
 60  For some of the American literature, see Vermuele,  Judging under Uncertainty , n 20 above, ch 
7;  W N  Eskridge Jr  Dynamic Statutory Interpretation ( Cambridge, Mass :   Harvard University Press , 
 1994 ) ;  F B  Cross  Th e Th eory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation ( Stanford :   Stanford University 
Press ,  2009 ) . See also C R Sunstein, ‘Law and Administration After  Chevron’ Columbia LR (1990) 
90: 2071; C R Farina, ‘Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State’ 
 Columbia LR (1989) 89: 452. For an interesting contrast with the UK position, see T A O Endicott 
 Administrative Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 325–330. 
 61  See the ‘Note by Professor Laski on the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes’, Annex V to the 
Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers (Donoughmore Committee), Cmd 4060/1932 (1932) 
135–6. See also F Frankfurter and N Greene  Th e Labour Injunction (New York: Macmillan, 1930). 
 62  ‘Note by Professor Laski on the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes’. 
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local or central) to special Courts. No gain which might result therefrom in fl exibility of 
construction seems to me to counterbalance the value of the independent assessment of 
statutory intention which is now aff orded by the ordinary Courts. Th e historical principle 
of the rule of law cannot, I think, be better protected than by making ordinary judges the 
men who decide the legality of executive action. 
 Laski was quick to add, however, that ‘this is not to say the methods of interpreta-
tion now used by the Courts are satisfactory.’ 63 Th e bulk of his note illustrated the 
potential dangers of judicial interpretation, outlining a critique of legal formalism 
in the United States and Britain that few liberals would disagree with today. 64 His 
concluding remark on interpretive doctrines fi ts with the conclusions of this essay. 
 6.  Procedural fairness competence 
 Th e courts’ competence in respect of procedural fairness is refl ected well in their 
history of fashioning and protecting the rules of the paradigm of procedural jus-
tice, namely, the judicial process. Th is is refl ected in the two principles of natural 
justice (ie. that an adjudicator must be impartial and hear both sides). Furthermore, 
judges have devised and evolved procedures concerning the admissibility of evidence, 
and procedures for pleading, notice to opposing parties, transparent reasons etc. 
Th ese practices refl ect a cultivated institutional memory concerning basic proce-
dural fairness for parties to a dispute. Th e role for courts in giving such protection 
has been recognized around the world in both administrative and constitutional 
law. 65 Procedural fairness secures a range of ends, including individual dignity for 
the aff ected person, equal treatment of similarly situated persons, and accuracy in 
administrative and judicial decision-making. 
 Objection:
 •  Th e judicial conception of procedural fairness is too warped around the model of 
the trial. 
 One concern is that judges may seek to impose the paradigm of the judicial process 
upon a complex bureaucracy that can ill-aff ord the procedural luxuries observed 
in the criminal and civil courts. Bureaucracies can groan under the weight and 
expense created by extensive oral hearings for items such as the termination of 
welfare benefi ts. Th is is the crux of Mashaw’s argument in  Due Process in the 
Administrative State  (and his particular target was constitutional due process rights 
in the welfare state, a particularly diffi  cult issue).  66 Mashaw felt that judges did 
not understand the dynamic impact that was created by their judgments, and they 
 63  ‘Note by Professor Laski on the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes’, 135. 
 64  ‘Note by Professor Laski on the Judicial Interpretation of Statutes’ at 135–6. 
 65  See, generally,  D  Galligan  Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures 
( Oxford University Press ,  Oxford,  1996 ) ;  F  Michelman,  ‘Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural 
Due Process’ in  J  Penock and  J  Chapman (eds)  Due Process, Nomos XVIII ( New  York University 
Press :  New York,   1977 ) . 
 66  J L  Mashaw  Due Process in the Administrative State ( New Haven :  Yale University Press,  1985 ) ; see 
also Harlow and Rawlings,  Law and Administration , n 59 above, ch 14. 
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were powerless to reverse changes they promoted that turned out to be dysfunctional. 
Th is can be connected more broadly with Vermeule’s concern that judges cannot 
see the dynamic eff ects of their judgments, and that they should therefore employ 
a type of formalism that embraces strong judicial restraint. 67 
 Th ese are potent warnings, but none of the above suggests any more than a 
qualifi cation to the claim that procedural fairness is one benefi t of legal account-
ability. Mashaw, notwithstanding his criticism, ultimately saw an essential role for 
legal accountability: ‘Individualized hearings, before independent decision-makers 
with demands for proof and judgment on the record are a major bulwark against 
state oppression.’ 68 Furthermore, the evolution of procedural rights in public law 
has proceeded at a glacial pace in the United Kingdom, a special light-touch review 
applies to fair trial rights in the administrative process (both in the UK and in the 
relevant Strasbourg authority under the ECHR), 69 and the American phenomenon 
of regulatory ossifi cation is largely confi ned to that country. 
 7.  Participation 
 A number of rights advocates claim that legally enforceable rights will provide a 
much- needed avenue of participation for those marginalized and vulnerable groups 
which are eff ectively excluded from legislative or executive decision-making. 70 
On a more pedestrian level, trials and hearings give people the right to complain 
about the decision aff ecting them, and the enforceable power to be heard. Even a 
lost hearing is more satisfying than no hearing at all. Th e take-up rate of this right 
to a hearing is in fact very low, an issue driving extensive studies in legal needs. 71 
However, the infl uence of law is felt well beyond the courtroom, in settlement activity, 
often made possible by the ultimate recourse to judicial remedies. 72 Expanded rules 
on standing and intervention have facilitated greater means for participation and 
representation. 73 
 67  Vermeule,  Judging under Uncertainty , n 20 above. 
 68  Mashaw, ‘Bureaucracy, Democracy and Judicial Review’, n 11 above. 
 69  For UK administrative law, see  R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody  [1994] AC 531 (HL). For the 
interpretation of Convention rights under the HRA1998, see  Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] 
UKSC 8; and for the position of the Strasbourg Court see  Bryan v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 
342 and  Tsfayo v United Kingdom [2006] All ER D 177; (2006) 48 EHRR 18. 
 70  Ely,  Democracy and Distrust , n 48 above; A Kavanagh, ‘Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply 
to Jeremy Waldron’  Law and Philosophy (2003) 22: 451;  S  Fredman  Human Rights Transformed: Positive 
Rights and Positive Duties ( Oxford University Press,  2008 ),  77–9 ,  105–7 . See also  I CON (2007) 
5: 183, the entire issue being an exploration of the comparative eff ectiveness of courts as a forum for 
the participation of the marginalized. 
 71  H  Genn  Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal Injury Actions ( Oxford :  Clarendon 
Press ,  1987 ) ; M Galanter, ‘Why the Haves Come out Ahead’  Law & Society Rev 95 (1974). 9: 95. 
 72  V Bondy and M Sunkin, ‘Settlement in Judicial Review Proceedings’  PL (2009) 237. 
 73  See  JUSTICE,  To Assist the Court: Th ird Party Interventions in the UK ( London :  JUSTICE ,  2009 ) . 
Cf Harlow, ‘Public Law and Popular Justice’, n 12 above; Stewart, ‘Th e Reformation of American 
Administrative Law’, 1760ff , n 12 above. Despite Stewart’s criticisms of the model, see 1805–13 for 
his more nuanced conclusions. 
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 Objections:
 •  People are alienated by the judicial process and have little say in hearings . 
 Th is claim is no doubt partly true, but often overstated. (Access to justice is particularly 
jurisdiction-specifi c, so I have chosen the UK as my home jurisdiction in the dis-
cussion that follows). In Hazel Genn’s  Paths to Justice , broad surveys of civil justice 
revealed, for instance, that courts and tribunals were considered more stressful and 
alienating than mediation. 74 Yet while eighty-fi ve percent of tribunals and court 
users said they would defi nitely or probably repeat the process, only sixty-seven 
per cent of those using mediation said the same. 75 Most interestingly, the most 
common response of claimants disappointed with how they resolved their justi-
ciable problem was that they did pursue suffi  ciently formal means. 76 Th is is not an 
incoherent set of results. Standing up for one’s rights can be both frightening and 
ultimately rewarding, just as with some sports, or avant-garde art. 
 What about lawyers, then, who do much of the standing up? Of those court 
and tribunal users represented by lawyers, ninety-three per cent of represented 
respondents said that they would not have been better off  at the hearing without 
representation, and ninety-two per cent thought they were represented either very 
well or fairly well. 77 Sixty-fi ve per cent said they had a chance to get across 
everything they wanted to say at the hearing, and another ten per cent said they 
got most of what they wanted to say across. About ninety per cent said they under-
stood what was going on at the hearing. While it is wise not to be romantic about 
civil justice in the courts, we sell legal accountability short by understating its value 
for most citizens. 
 •  Only the rich have reasonable access to courts. 
 Th at is quite a common claim, but the true picture is far more complex. According 
to Genn’s study, over a quarter of those respondents who incurred legal costs in 
Britain were legally aided. 78 Other recent studies have found that judicial review 
is actually higher in London boroughs that are more marginalized and poorer. 79 
Indeed, the poor in Britain are actually  more likely to consult a lawyer in a grievance 
against the government than are the wealthy or the middle classes. 80 Th is phenomenon 
is not only explained by the UK’s relatively generous legal aid system, though 
that is no doubt relevant. Herbert Kritzer consolidated comparative studies on 
legal needs covering eight countries. 81 His fi ndings were ‘remarkably consistent’ in 
 74  H  Genn (et al)  Paths to Justice: What People Do and Th ink About Going to Law ( Oxford :   Hart 
Publishing ,  1999 )  194–5 . 
 75  Genn  Paths to Justice , 218, 222.    76  Genn  Paths to Justice,  205. 
 77  Genn  Paths to Justice,  2__.    78  Genn  Paths to Justice,  166. 
 79  L  Platt,  M  Sunkin and  K  Calvo ,  ‘Judicial Review Litigation as an Incentive to Change in Local 
Authority Public Services in England and Wales’  Journal of Public Administration Research and Th eory 
( 2010 )  20 :  243 . 
 80  H.  Kritzer ,  ‘To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer? Is that the question?’  Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 
( 2008 )  5 :  875 , fi g.12 (citing the data of  P  Pleasence ,  N  Balmer and  A  Buck , Causes of Action: Civil Law 
and Social Justice (2nd edn,  London :  Legal Services Research Centre ,  2006 ) ). 
 81  Kritzer, ‘To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer?, 875. 
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showing that ‘income has relatively little impact on decisions to seek the assistance 
or advice of a lawyer.’ 82 
 •  Judicial review in fact disrupts a more meaningful mechanism for participation; 
namely, voting. 
 Th is objection is ordinarily only true of the subset of cases involving the review 
of legislation for its constitutionality. Th e objection amounts to the following 
argument: the remedy given to the person who comes before the court invalidates 
a statute adopted in a procedure that gives more meaningful participation to every-
one equally. Th ose whose decision is represented in the statute are not represented 
in the hearing at which their interests are eff ectively decided. In that sense, the 
‘participation’ of one person or group in court is the negation of many others’ 
participation at the ballot box. Th is argument is true in a formal sense, but its sig-
nifi cance depends on (1) the quality of a claimant’s participation in the legislative 
process, and (2) the adequacy of the representational role played by counsel for the 
state in such hearings. As to the fi rst, John Hart Ely presented the most sustained 
analysis of how judicial review might compensate for the representative defi ciencies 
of the majoritarian legislative process. As for the second, we must recall that the 
non-participation of the aggrieved voter in the legal process does not mean that 
she is not represented in the process. Th e state and judges alike both represent that 
public interest. And unlike the marginalized claimant in the political process, the 
average voter is  well-represented in the legal process to the point of being presumed 
correct until an onerous burden is met in showing otherwise. In my view, nevertheless, 
this objection has enough to it to merit the adoption of a theory of constitutional 
judicial review that gives strong prominence to the issue of representation in 
judicial review. 83 
 •  Th e administrative and legislative processes are far better at facilitating inclusion. 
 People can participate in the legislative and administrative process by responsing 
to consultation exercises during the green and white paper phases of the legislative 
process, or submit observations to parliamentary committees, or lobby parliamen-
tarians by post, in the fl esh at the constituency surgery, or by e-petition. In the 
United States, the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 provides for a quite elaborate 
notice-and-comment procedure for much rule-making. Advocacy groups need no 
lessons on the availability and limitations of these channels. Th e important point 
is that there is no reason to think that these various avenues of participation are 
incompatible with using adjudicators as well. Legal accountability off ers individuals 
the right to lodge claims about compliance with public standards (law), not merely 
an additional view to be added to the heap. 
 82  Kritzer, ‘To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer?, 900. Th is discussion has been adapted from King,  Judging 
Social Rights , n 22 above at 79–81, where some relevant further studies are considered, including those 
expressing reservations about Kritzer’s conclusion. 
 83  I have done so in King,  Judging Social Rights, n 22 above, ch 6. See also the work of Rosalind 
Dixon, ‘Th e Supreme Court of Canada’ n 32 above. 
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 8.  Expressiveness 
 Legal accountability can play an expressive function in law by applying key 
principles, policies or other values in the text of published decisions. Th ese values 
become part of the fabric of public discourse, and can have an impact in subtle 
ways. In Genn’s study, nearly three quarters of respondents agreed that ‘[c] ourts 
are an important way for ordinary people to enforce their rights.’ 84 Scholars also 
recognize the expressive function of law in enshrining values and providing a norma-
tive framework for moral debate, particularly with respect to legislation. 85 Th is is 
doubtless a key part of adjudication, in both private and public law, which employ 
a range of normative concepts such as fairness, reasonableness, discrimination, good 
faith, equity and so on. Th ere is a range of important things that society cannot 
do without judicial or quasi-judicial hearing: child custody and child protection, 
criminal conviction, deportation, eviction, and many others. Our basic understand-
ing of courts is that they ought to provide not just dispute resolution, but  justice . 
As Owen Fiss stated: ‘Th e judicial role is limited by the existence of constitutional 
values, and the function of the judiciary is to give meaning to those values.’ 86 Variants 
of this view are also advanced in the work of Ronald Dworkin, T R S Allan, and 
Robert Alexy. 
 Expressiveness is not merely empty rhetoric, but it does have an uncertain 
relationship to consequences; a point that threatens its value as an instrument. Th e 
expressive elements of published legal judgments do not tend to generate large and 
sudden changes to institutions. Yet they may have real and valuable eff ects. For 
one, they can be of immediate and profound psychological importance to petition-
ers, for whom a declaration alone can constitute just satisfaction even of a human 
rights violation. More importantly, expressiveness about basic values can reinforce 
systemic values (eg. the rule of law, good administration) that buttress a complex 
system of politics. For example, the principle of the rule of law in the United 
Kingdom was developed fi rst by the courts of law, expounded by some doctrinal 
writers, and later recognised by both Parliament and government as being a cardinal 
constitutional principle. 87 If Dicey were believed, most of the civil liberties the 
English came to cherish (and ultimately export) also arose this way. 88 
 84  Genn (et al),  Paths to Justice , n 74 above at 227. 
 85  C R  Sunstein ‘ On the Expressive Function of Law ’  U of Penn L Rev ( 1995 –6)  144 :  2021 ;  W  van 
der Burg ,  ‘Th e Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, Especially with Regard to Moral 
Issues’  Law & Philosophy ( 2001 )  20 :  31 . 
 86  O Fiss, ‘Foreword: Th e Forms of Justice’  Harvard L Rev 1 (1979) 93: 1, 11. 
 87  AV  Dicey  Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (8th edn,  London :  MacMillan ,  1915 ), Pt 
II;  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL); Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, s 1. Th ere is a brief mention of the principle in  Th e Cabinet Manual: A Guide to 
Laws, Conventions and Rules on the Operation of Government (London: Cabinet Offi  ce, 2011), 49 
[6.4]. 
 88  Dicey,  Introduction to the Law of the Constitution , ch.V-VII. At 124, he contrasts the law of 
England with foreign bills of rights by arguing that ‘with us freedom of person is not a special privilege 
but the outcome of the ordinary law of the land enforced by the Courts.’ 
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 Objection:
 •  Symbolic legality is of limited value. 89 
 Th is objection is true, but consistent with what has been said above. Symbolism 
and expressiveness are of some value on an ethical level. Suppose that midway 
through some human rights or sexual harassment litigation, the respondent off ers 
to settle by giving the claimant all that he or she seeks (including an apology). 
Would the claimant still have a good case for taking the claim forward, or should 
the court dismiss the case for mootness? Th e answer is that the claimant has a right 
not just to claim compensation, but justice. Legal accountability off ers authoritative 
resolution, publicity, and an affi  rmation not just of wrongdoing or mistake, but of 
 illegality  and  injustice . A symbolic end still counts as a real end, as it is connected 
with the well-being of individuals who have legitimate interests in obtaining that 
type of satisfaction. 
 I have already noted the way in which expressiveness can have important 
systemic consequences. Many thought  Brown v Board of Education had this eff ect, 
though there is much evidence to the contrary. 90 Important cases can reinforce an 
attitude of respect for rights and the rule of law. Th ese infl uences may be weak, 
but they are not negligible. Even so, and as Sunstein notes, expressiveness can also 
have important immediate consequences. 91 Th e common law facilitates its own 
growth by grand statements of expressive principle. Today’s obiter dicta become 
tomorrow’s ratio decidendi. 
 9.  Publicity 
 Legal accountability can generate publicity and political salience. Litigation can 
become a locus for political action and can form an instrumental part of a political 
campaign. Th is is the key observation being returned from legal mobilization studies 
in law and politics, which document a series of iterative exchanges between legal 
and political avenues for change used by litigators seeking policy reform. 92 Episodes 
of political activity are followed by legal cases, which may lead to fruitful political 
outcomes even when cases are lost. Awful judgments can lead to legislative amend-
ment. 93 Controversy surrounding judicial rulings or court activity often ignites the 
 89  Rosenberg,  Th e Hollow Hope , n 43 above at 424 (‘[S] ymbolic victories may be mistaken for sub-
stantive ones, covering a reality that is distasteful.’); Mashaw,  Bureaucratic Justice, n 13 above at 11 
(‘But what are we to do when symbolic legality wears thin?’). 
 90  347 US 483 (1954). Rosenberg,  Th e Hollow Hope , n 43 above; Klarman,  From Jim Crow to Civil 
Rights , n 43 above. 
 91  Sunstein, n 86 above, at 2045–2048. Th is has been confi rmed in some studies: P Funk, ‘Is there 
an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines’  American 
Law and Economics Rev (2007) 9: 135. 
 92  See the studies cited above, n 42. For an excellent UK/Canadian study in this vein, see  L  Vanhala , 
 Making Rights a Reality? Disability Rights Activists and Legal Mobilization ( Cambridge :   Cambridge 
University Press ,  2011 ) . 
 93  As occurred in  R v Hillingdon LBC, ex p Puhlhofer [1986] 1 AC 485 (HL) case (reversed in 
Parliament, in the Housing and Planning Act 1986, s14(2), amending the Housing Act 1985, s 58), 
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public consciousness, media and political process. Th e interplay between courts, 
parliamentary committees, advocacy groups, and Parliament itself can mean that 
court battles actually invigorate the overall political process by focusing its atten-
tion on rights-issues, and by providing narratives that give living colour to general 
social problems. In this respect, even lost cases can represent political victories, 
as the exposure of poignant stories can create sympathy and increase the costs of 
political interference or apathy. 94 
 Objection :
 •  Assuming legal episodes do create publicity and political salience, it can be as negative 
as it is positive. 
 Th e legal mobilization studies have shown that advocates do use legal battles 
in iterative combination with political campaigning to achieve their objectives. 
However, there are other case studies as well, demonstrating the phenomenon of 
backlash. Anyone familiar with the tabloid press in Britain will know that the salience 
of the HRA 1998 on its pages is no triumph for legal accountability. Th e back-
lash phenomenon in parts of America has been much worse. It has occured when 
groups mobilize in reaction to litigation, but in the eff ort of reversing the eff ects 
of the court judgment—sometimes violently (as in the case of reactionary racist 
groups in southern America after  Brown ), sometimes by means of agitating for con-
stitutional amendment (as in many American states on the issue of gay marriage), 
or by mobilizing to advance a political agenda (such as libertarianism) through the 
courts and legislature, or by politicizing the judicial appointments process to an 
undue extent. 95 Th is phenomenon is less familiar to Commonwealth countries, 
but the experience in Britain is that the infl uential tabloid press has succeeded in 
generating considerable political opposition to human rights legislation. 96 
 Th is is admittedly an area in which there is evidence that cuts both ways. I have 
elsewhere argued that the backlash phenomenon is both disputed in the United States 
and at any rate is a phenomenon that may be peculiar to that country in particular. 97 
Th e argument that anti-human rights publicity generated by legal accountability 
and with whether private care companies ought to be regarded as public authorities under the HRA 
1998 (Health and Social Care Act 2008, s 145 reversing  YL v Birmingham CC [2007] UKHL 27). 
 94  Th is eff ect is often doubted, but it was what occurred, for instance, in the famous  R v Cambridge 
Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 FLR 1056 (QB); 2 All ER 129 (CA) case (see C Ham, ‘Tragic 
choices in health care: lessons from the Child B case’  British Medical Journal (1999) 319: 1258). Th e 
same occurred in the protracted dispute concerning the Chagos Islanders, as recounted in the judg-
ment of the House of Lords in  R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aff airs 
(No 2) [2008] UKHL 61. Vanhala,  Making Rights a Reality? n 93 above, also documents a number 
of such cases. 
 95  On civil rights and the backlash more generally, see Klarman, above note 43, ch.7. More gener-
ally, see  R  Post and  R  Siegal ,  ‘Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash’  Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review ( 2007 )  42 :  373 . 
 96  As noted with great concern in Equality and Human Rights Commission,  Human Rights 
Inquiry: Report of the EHRC (London: EHRC 2009). 
 97  King,  Judging Social Rights , n 22 above, ch 3. 
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can be politically regressive has little support in the United Kingdom. It is true 
that human rights cases have generated the ire of the press, but the agitation is for 
a return to the status quo before the adoption of the HRA 1998. Th at cannot be 
considered regress unless the HRA 1998 is considered progress. Th e argument is 
therefore self-defeating. 
 10.  Inter-institutional collaboration 
 Th e process of legal accountability, and its reasoned interpretive output, in my view 
is better understood to be in a collaborative relationship with the other branches 
of government, than functioning as a mere ‘check’ or ‘veto’ upon them. 98 Are pro-
cedural fairness rights best understood as an impediment or a contribution to 
effi  cient administration? Does requiring agencies and ministers to act within the 
powers set out in their empowering statute interfere with eff ective government? 
Should the orders of the Information Tribunal to disclose information be regarded 
as fundamentally punitive, or ultimately as measures that can improve administration 
by rendering it more transparent? We  could in each case frame the relationships as 
those of warden and delinquent. However, it is more accurate to understand them 
as akin to that between a free press and a well-functioning government. To say they 
are fundamentally ‘opposed’ is to misunderstand the relationship. Th e relationship 
is tense at times, but good government in fact  depends  on a free press, just as it 
depends on a healthy respect for the rule of law. When the government does its job 
the press helps it get the message out to the public. When it does not or is evasive, 
it exposes the lapse in the hopes for correction. 
 In my view, each of the branches essentially collaborates (at a respectful distance) 
with the others in the implementation of key public goals, for example respect 
for human rights, allocative effi  ciency, environmental protection, public and work-
place safety, the best interests of children, and many others. Parliament scrutinizes 
government on the implementation of these goals, and opens it up to challenge 
in myriad ways. Parliamentary committees off er important guidance and criticism 
on a range of matters considered by both the executive and the courts. Th e House 
of Lords Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
though obviously attractive to lawyers, are nonetheless exemplars in this regard. 
Both engage in bill scrutiny and draw upon principles expounded by courts as well 
as other non-legal sources of constitutional principle and policy. Th e executive, for 
its part, also engages in considerable work at promoting and giving eff ect to the 
aforementioned principles. While it takes the lead with respect to the environment, 
effi  ciency, and regulation of the workplace, it also plays a strong role in promoting 
respect for human rights principles. Ministers must carry out compliance research 
before issuing statements of compatibility under s19 of the HRA 1998. Th e 
 98  For a discussion of the traditional theory and a more modern theory that accords better with the 
view presented here, see  E  Carolan  Th e New Separation of Powers ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press , 
 2010 ) . For judicial review as a veto, which I consider contrary to the analysis here, see  R H  Fallon Jr, 
 ‘Th e Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review’  Harvard L Rev ( 2008 )  121 :  1693 . 
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government also creates and funds bodies that are vigilant in addressing human 
rights issues, such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Citizen’s 
Advice. Furthermore it has issued a considerable amount of guidance to its own 
departments and to local authorities on the topic of human rights. 99 
 Th is type of collaboration is a phenomenon, but it is also a prima facie benefi t 
off ered by courts because they have institutional features that can further it. In 
particular, general jurisdiction, an inherent law reforming power, and remedial 
discretion allow adjudicators, especially in public law, to complement the system 
of accountability by adjusting the scope of review and range of substantive remedies 
to shifting demand over time. For example, in the early days of the welfare state, 
when there was a perceived need for courts not to impede the practice of demolish-
ing housing deemed unfi t for human habitation, the House of Lords refused to 
extend to an aggrieved landlord a right to an oral hearing, and a right to see the 
report of the inspector that formed the basis for the closing order. 100 By 1964, 
the House of Lords decided in  Ridge v Baldwin that there could be a duty of 
procedural fairness in respect of ordinary administrative decisions as well as those 
by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. 101 Th irty years later, what was announced as 
possible in 1964 was confi rmed as always applicable in  ex p Doody , but with the 
caveat that the requirements of fairness were to be particularly fl exible and depend 
entirely on the circumstances. 102 In all three cases, the courts adjusted to the needs 
of modernizing administration and administrative justice. Th e development is not 
always a matter of increased judicial scrutiny, either. For example, there has been an 
increased recent emphasis on the importance of deference to tribunal expertise, 103 
which is something of a departure from the formal approach taken in cases such as 
 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission . 104 
 When the comity between institutions is healthy, it is possible for the inher-
ent fl exibility of public law principles and remedies to be adjusted as needed to 
suit evolving needs for accountability in the contemporary state. Th e remedy of 
declaratory relief, in particular, off ers the possibility of facilitating this type of 
collaboration by giving the executive latitude by way of response. A declaration of 
incompatibility under s 4 of the HRA 1998 off ers similar latitude to Parliament in 
respect of primary legislation found incompatible with the European Convention. 
Th is fl exibility and adaptability breeds comity and collaboration, which in turn 
 99  On guidance, see Dept. of Health,  Human Rights in Health Care: A Framework for Local Action 
(2nd edn, 2008); Dept. of Communities and Local Government,  Guidance for Local Authorities on 
Contracting for Services in Light of the Human Rights Act 1998 (2005); Borders and Immigration 
Agency,  Asylum Policy Instructions:  European Convention on Human Rights (2006, ‘re-branded’ in 
2008) and  Article 8 of the ECHR (2009) and  Considering Human Rights Claims (2009). Other codes 
of practice highlight the importance of compliance with the HRA 1998 among their general princi-
ples: see Dept. of Health,  Code of Practice: Th e Mental Health Act 1983 (2008) ch 1, esp.1.7. On the 
bureaucratic impact of the HRA 1998, see EHRC,  Human Rights Inquiry, n 97 above. 
 100  Local Government Board v Arlidge  [1915] AC 120 (HL). 
 101  Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40(HL). 
 102  R v Home Secretary, ex p Doody  [1994] AC 531, 560 (HL). 
 103  R (Cart) v Th e Upper Tribunal; MR (Pakistan) v Th e Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 [48]-[49]. 
 104  [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL). 
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allows legal accountability to meet the ebb and fl ow of demand for it. Since 
accountability in modern government promotes fairness, individual dignity, the 
rule of law, and respect for democratic accountability, its ultimate value is or at any 
rate can be quite positive. 
 Objection : 
 •  Legal accountability is comparatively quite rigid. 
 Adjudication initially appears to be quite rigid. It must be triggered by a petitioner. 
Th ere is a limited range of remedies. Th e court cannot make recommendations 
or insist on apologies, or (generally speaking) call large meetings to thrash things 
out and compromise. It is also constrained doctrinally in all the ways mentioned 
above. And there are strong limits on what kind of further research judges can do 
when an issue is raised in litigation. Th ey cannot (in the common law world) visit 
the site of the disturbance and knock on the neighbours’ doors. 
 Th is is all true, but these limitations fl ow from the same features that give legal 
accountability its hard edge, its relative degree of autonomy, and its constitutional 
authority. Its working methods are not as fl exible as those of a minister or inspector, 
but neither is the judge removable. And judges cannot change their minds from one 
day to the next, but nor should they when their decisions are reported and relied 
upon. Th e fact is that legal accountability is fl exible enough to facilitate adaptation 
and collaboration over time, but its fl exibility is suited to its character as a potent 
form of relief. Furthermore, diff erent potential forms of legal accountability show 
diff erent potential for fl exible approaches. Th e Parliamentary Ombudsman shares 
many important attributes with legal accountability. Yet the ombudsman also has 
investigative powers, has fashioned principles of good administration, and com-
monly makes policy recommendations that aim to improve administration. While 
there are occasional areas of friction, 105 her role is essentially complementary rather 
than entirely antagonistic. 
 D.  Conclusion 
 Th e ten prima facie benefi ts outlined above in my view constitute a core of instru-
mental value off ered by legal accountability. In most cases, the benefi t asserted is 
at least to some extent contingent. It is not asserted that the existence of each 
feature leads inexorably to the attainment of a benefi cial end (net of its costs). 
It is rather contended that in many systems of legal accountability that possess 
these features, it will be common for them to function as prima facie benefi ts that 
are nonetheless rebuttable. Th e benefi ts, again, are:  focus; principled reasoning; 
constitutional authority; independence and impartiality; rule-interpretation com-
petence; procedural fairness competence; participation; expressiveness; publicity; 
 105  R Kirkham, ‘Challenging the Authority of the Ombudsman: Th e Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 
Special report on Wartime Detainees’  MLR (2006) 69: 792. 
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and inter-institutional collaboration. Whether these prima facie benefi ts amount 
to actual benefi ts will depend on the contexts in which they are applied. It is hoped 
the list will help point out fruitful areas for inquiry, and perhaps emphasize, as a 
form of feedback, which aspects of legal accountability stand out as particularly 
important for securing these prima facie benefi ts. For instance, the requirement 
of giving reasoned decisions appears to be more greatly respected in some legal 
systems than in others. And of course, in those systems where the judiciary is 
not independent, the analysis suggests that we have reason to doubt whether it is 
appropriately called legal accountability at all. 
 Th is leaves one diffi  cult methodological issue that I  will address by way of 
conclusion. It is the problem of incommensurability. A list of benefi ts and stated 
costs may imply to some that I envisage some heaven of commensuration wherein 
if we had all relevant information, all the variables could be compared and that an 
arithmetical operation would yield the answer to any question of legal institutional 
design. I have no such idea in mind. At the end of any fully informed analysis, 
some public fi gure will need to decide just how much individual consideration is 
worth a reduction of allocative effi  ciency, and whether some amount of judicial 
independence is worth a novel extension of responsibilities through, for example, 
a new tribunal or bill of rights. Th e fact that these public choices require diffi  cult 
judgement and are not reducible to any calculus does not mean that an account 
of benefi ts and costs is useless to the task. Sure, someone must simply decide, 
but they must decide in light of the best information. And if we accept that legal 
accountability is a means, we must have an approach to public decision-making 
that is susceptible to evidence of its success and costs before any sensible choices 
can be made. 
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